For over decades, the Afghan milieu has conveniently cultured the existence and growth of transnational terror groups and militant organisations. Amid a wide array of terror groups such as Al Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, Islamic State – Khorasan Province, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and countless smaller splinter groups; the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is one. Predominantly, poised against China and Chinese interests in the region, the ETIM not only poses grave threats to Chinese development infrastructure across regional countries, but also threatens the broader progress of the Belt and Road Initiative. As its operational strength increases, the ETIM is an alarming threat for central Asian republics as well as for Pakistan.
The East Turkistan Islamic Movement rose as the ‘Turkistan Islamic Party’ in China’s Xinjiang region during 1940s. An internationally designated terrorist organization, the ETIM seeks to carve out an autonomous “Islamic state” for ethnic Uyghur Muslims living in China and in adjacent Central Asian states. The creatin of ETIM was rooted in Chinese Uighur Muslims’ disenchantment toward Mao Zedong’s anti-religious policies and Deng Xiaoping’s post-1978 liberal reforms. In 1956, it rebranded as ETIM. However, over the course of its evolution, ETIM faced heavy-handed crackdowns from Chinese administration leading to its inactivity during 1960s, followed by its resurgence during 1980s. In Afghanistan, this group visibly surfaced during the 1990s.
The ETIM has been responsible for conducting some of the most high-profile terror attacks in China including the 2013 Tiananmen Square attack , the 2014 Kunming Railway Station attack and the Urumqi Railway Station attack, and the 2011 Hotan and Kashgar attacks. Over the years, the ETIM’s operational modality has expanded to include attacks not only inside China, but also outside China. However, so far, their targets have predominantly been ethnic Chinese Hans, and other Chinese minority nationals, in addition to Chinese state infrastructure and Chinese forces. However, as the Chinese economic and developmental footprint is expanding globally, as well as regionally, the ETIM is actively looking to sabotage Chinese interests in the region. This renders regional states hosting Chinese investments and infrastructure increasingly prone to ETIM-led terrorism.
The ETIM mainly operates from Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban and the ETIM are no strangers. During the Afghan Taliban’s first rein (1996-2001), it shared cordial ties with the ETIM; a predominant factor that led Beijing into supporting the first round of United Nations Sanctions against the regime. In 2021 as well, the ETIM was involved in facilitating the Afghan Taliban during the fall of Kabul. Even as of today, under the Afghan Taliban, Afghanistan continues to be a rear base as well as an ideological incubator for the ETIM. Despite some relocations of their hideouts – that too in 2021 – the ETIM operatives nevertheless continue to retain their sanctuaries. This allows them to conveniently regroup, establish their training camps, design and conduct militant activity, and further indoctrinate recruits; thereby quantitively adding to their cadre.
Furthermore, the ETIM also has long-standing ties with other Afghanistan-based terror groups. Its ability to gel-in with other terrorist groups allows it to amplify its destructive signature. The ETIM members are reported to have received training and logistical support from the Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). While a great deal of logistical support is provided by Al Qaeda, training which includes guerilla warfare tactics, use of conventional weapons, carrying out assassination, usage of explosives, and poisoning. This has allowed the ETIM to operate not just against Chinese interests in Afghanistan, but also to carry attacks in the autonomous Xinjiang region, as well as in Pakistan, Chechnya and Uzbekistan. Moreover, following the fall of Bashar-al Assad’s regime, the battle-hardened fighting cadre of the ETIM operating in Syria also is expected to return to Afghanistan. This will further raise the stakes for Chinese interests and other regional states’ security.
Since 2021, the ETIM has been involved in carrying out terror activity particularly against Chinese installations and forces, however, unlike other terror groups, the ETIM rarely issues any verifiable public claims. Nevertheless, the marked uptick in ETIM’s activity in recent years has raised concerns for Beijing. The ETIM-led terror activity not just risks to bolster anti-China terrorism in Xinjiang region, but also foments radicalization and undermines social cohesion within Chinese ethnic groups in China. Beyond China, the impact of ETIM’s terror activities is also grave for CARs, which too have experienced terrorism – albeit relatively sporadic. Hence, the looming threat of further destabilization through the revival and expansion of such transnational groups is equally concerning for the central Asian states.
However, most importantly, the emerging threat of ETIM for Pakistan is alarmingly dangerous, not just because of its mere presence, but also due to its capacity to act as a bridge between anti-Pakistan terror groups. Already, the ETIM shares cordial ties with the TTP as well as the IS-KP. Both TTP and IS-KP are responsible for carrying some of the most horrendous and gruesome terror attacks in Pakistan. While the ETIM is already based in Pakistan in regions bordering Afghanistan, their collusion with TTP and IS-KP shall only allow the ETIM to further make forays into Pakistan. As an obvious impact, the Chinese This shall also severely challenge the security of Chinese infrastructure in Pakistan.
The threat of ETIM becomes all the more pronounced for Pakistan in case the ETIM operatives explore the probability of joining hands with Baloch ethno-nationalist groups in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. This is much likely given the fact that both miliotant groups view China as their primary adversary. Also, since both BLA and ETIM are relatively smaller groups in terms of numbers, therefore, they may also look to develop point of convergences over utility maximization of their targets and impact amplification. ETIM aligns with global jihadist networks such as Al-Qaeda, IS-KP, and TTP. Together, if BLA and ETIM join hands, they could become a major obstacle to Pakistan’s economic and security cooperation with China. In a nutshell, the collusion of ETIM with other terror groups as well as its consolidation holds the potential to severely undermine Pakistan’s internal security and its strategic interests vis-à-vis China.
Also read: Pakistan–Saudi Arabia Defense Pact: Pakistan as the Architect of a Muslim-World Security Order
